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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-PROVINCE OF LEGIS-
LATUR.-Defendant, who was convicted of the unlawful transportation of
"moonshine," was given the maximum sentence by the jury. On appeal he con-
tended that the punishment was excessive. Held, that since fixing the punish-
ment for crime is a legislative and not a judicial function, appellate courts can
not adjudge as excessive a punishment which is within the range prescribed by
statute. State v. Wheeler, 2 S. W. (2d) 777 (Mo., 1928).
The eighth amendment to the Federal Constitution provides against cruel and
unusual punishment. This provision has reference only to federal statutes
and does not apply to state statutes establishing punishment for crimes. Com-
nonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N. E. 504; Loeb v. Jennings, 133 Ga.
796, 67 S. E. 101. Most states have in their bill of rights clauses similar to the
federal amendment. Article 2, Section 25 of the Missouri Constitution is such
a provision, and is the one sought to be invoked in the principal case in an effort
to have the punishment adjudicated excessive, on the ground that it was cruel and
unusual. But such a prohibition has reference only to the statutes fixing the
punishment and not to the punishment assessed by the jury or court within the
limits of the statute. If the statute is not in violation of the constitution then
any punishment assessed within the limits of such statute can not be adjudged
excessive. State v. Alexander, 315 Mo. 199, 285 S. W. 984; State v. Van Wye,
136 Mo. 227, 37 S. W. 938; Miller v. State, 149 Ind. 607, 49 N. E. 894; Common-
wealth v. Murphy, supra; State v. Davis, 88 S. C 229, 70 S. E. 811. The term
cruel and unusual punishment means that the mode of punishment is of a
barbarous character and unknown to the common law. State v. Williams, 77
Mo. 310; State v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 429. "It devolves upon the legislature to
fix the punishment for crime and in the exercise of their judgment great lati-
tude must be allowed and courts may reasonably interfere only when the pun-
ishment is so unreasonable or so cruel as to meet the disapproval and condemna-
tion of the conscience and reason of men generally." State v. Becker, 3 S. D.
29, 51 N. W. 1018.
In the principal case the constitutionality of the statute under which the de-
fendant was convicted was not questioned. Therefore, in the light of the
authorities above cited, the Missouri Supreme Court properly refused to go into
the question of excessive punishment so long as such punishment was within that
prescribed by the limits of the statute. R. B. S., '30.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--STATUTE REGULATING ADMISSION TO BAR.-Appellant,
a member of the Philadelphia Bar, and a resident of Delaware County, applied
to the board of law examiners of that county for the purpose of becoming en-
rolled as a member of the Delaware County Bar. The Court rule provided that
"an applicant for admission to the bar of Delaware County shall make a formal
declaration in writing that he intends permanently to practice in that county, and
within three months to open his principal office there. . ." Olmstead did not
state his intention to open his principal office in Delaware County and his ap-
plication was refused. Held, that the rule of the court was binding upon all ap-
plicants, notwithstanding that a statute literally construed, apparently provided
to the contrary. In re Olmstead, 292 Pa. 96, 140 Atl. 634 (1928).
The judicial departments of the respective states have sagaciously sustained
the constitutionality of statutes providing reasonable requirements for admission
to the bar. Such action has been based upon the sensible attitude of the courts
to avoid friction with the legislative department, and a recognition of the police
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power of the legislature. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 379, 18 L. Ed. 366; In
re Mock, 146 Cal. 378, 80 Pac. 64. Also 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 288. However, all
courts have not recognized the power of the legislature to formulate qualifica-
tions for admission to the bar. Some courts, zealously guarding the constitu-
tional provisions creating the courts, have denied the existence of any power in
the legislature to prescribe prerequisities for the admission to the bar and have
held any attempt to do so an encroachment upon the judicial department and
void. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232; In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509. In the latter case
the court passed on a statute which provided for the admission of attorneys of
another state, holding that if the intention was to admit attorneys of another
state to practice, "it was clearly without the power of the legislature.' The
case of Re Applicants, 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635, is an extreme case, in which it
is apparent that the court has divested itself of what other courts have termed
their "inherent" power to prescribe rules and conditions for admission to the
bar. In that case the applicant's admission to the bar was opposed on the
ground that the applicant was not of good character, and the court held that
insofar as the legislature had prescribed the requirements for admission to the
bar it could not inquire into the character of the applicant since he had com-
plied with the requirements. The statute was held not to violate the constitu-
tional or inherent powers of the courts. No other case is so forceful in uphold-
ing the police power of the legislature in regulating the admission to the bar.
The case of Splane's Petition, 123 Pa. 527, 16 Atl. 481, considered a statute
which provided that one admitted to the bar in one county should on motion be
admitted to all other courts of the state. It was held to be an encroachment
upon the judicial department and void. But the principal case regarded the
decision of this point as mere obiter dictum and hence not binding.
In the principal case, the specific issue was whether a person, having been ad-
mitted to practice in one county, should on motion be admitted to the bar of
another county without first complying with the rules of the court. The dictum
in the case is stronger than the decision, but it is quite apparent that the spirit
of this case is inconsistent with that of Re Applicants, supra. The court said
that there are "certain functions of the lower courts, with which the legislature
cannot interfere, one of them being the power to adopt rules to facilitate the
proper dispatch of the business of such tribunals, instancing regulations relat-
ing to the service of notices and papers. When one who does not intend to es-
tablish an office in a county to whose courts he would be admitted, applies for
such admission, he is not to expect practitioners having established offices within
the county to be subjected to annoyance and inconvenience in the service of
papers upon him."
The court further states, "the adoption of a rule to minimize such annoyance
and inconvenience was within the power of the court, even if the rule in ques-
tion affected the right to be admitted to the bar of such court," and the court
reached this conclusion this notwithstanding a statute which, apparently pro-
vided to the contrary. M. L. M., '29.
CRiMiNA LAw-ENTRAPMENT.-While the defendant was engaged in making
a book on the horse races a police officer in plain clothes placed a bet with him.
Following the receipt of the money defendant was arrested for the statutory
offense of being custodian and depository of a bet placed on a contest of speed
of horses. Held, defendant may not avail himself of the defense of entrapment
where he was engaged in making a book on the races and the officers had not
incited him thereto. State v. Stolberg, 2 S. W. (2d) 618 (Mo., 1928).
Entrapment has been pithily defined as the "seduction or improper inducement
to commit a crime, and not the testing by trap, trickiness, or deceit of one sus-
pected." Undoubtedly the rule is as stated in the principal case, that where an
officer incites a person to commit a crime and lures him on to its consummation
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